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Malware plays a critical role in breaching computer
systems. The computing behavior of a register machine
program can be sabotaged, by making a very small
change to the original, uninfected program. Stability
has been studied extensively in dynamical systems and
in engineering. Our primary contribution introduces
a computing machine that is structurally stable to
small changes made to its program instructions.
Our procedures use quantum randomness to build
unpredictable stable instructions. Our procedures can
execute just before running a program so that the
computing task can be performed with a different
representation of its instructions during each run.
Our procedures are inspired by the Red Queen
hypothesis in biology: organisms evolve using
robustness, unpredictablity and variability to
hinder infection. Another contribution expands the
mathematical notion of stability to a cryptographic
model with an adversary, and explains why structurally
stable machines can be resistant to malware sabotage.
1. Introduction
Malware plays a critical role in breaching computer
systems. Cybersecurity research has primarily focused
on malware detection [1]. It seems unlikely that
malware detection methods can solely provide an
adequate solution to the malware problem: There does
not exist a register machine algorithm that can detect
all malware [2]. Furthermore, some recent malware
implementations use NP problems [3] to encrypt and
hide the malware [4]. Overall, detection methods are
currently up against fundamental limits in theoretical
computer science.
The instability of register machine computation
[5] enables malware to sabotage the purpose of a
computer program, by making small changes to one or
more instructions in an original, uninfected program.
Programming languages such as C, Java, Lisp and
Python rely upon register machine [6] branching
instructions. One sabotaged branching instruction
enables malware to start executing. Even if there is a
routine to verify that the program is executing properly,
this verification routine may never execute. Sequential
execution of unstable register machine instructions
cripples the program from protecting itself [7]1.
Prior mathematical research has not attempted
to design malware resistant computation based on
structural stability. For over 80 years, dynamical
systems has extensively studied structural stability [8, 9]
on phase spaces [10], containing an uncountable number
of states [11]2. During execution of a register machine,
the machine’s state at any moment lies in a discrete
space, containing a countable number of states.
Based on dynamical systems and information theory,
our primary contribution develops mathematical and
computational tools to build a structurally stable
sequential machine that is resistant to small changes to
the program instructions. Our approach is inspired by
the Red Queen hypothesis [12] in evolutionary biology:
organisms evolve using robustness, unpredictability
and variability to hinder infection from parasites.
Another contribution expands the notion of stability to
a cryptographic model with an adversary, and explains
why this structurally stable machine is resistant to
malware sabotage.
2. Motivating Stable Computation
Register machines execute one instruction at a time.
Even if there is a procedure to assure that the register
machine program is executing correctly, this friendly
procedure may never execute due to just one rogue
branch instruction. Typical programming languages
(e.g., C, Fortran, Java, Lisp and Python)
are Turing complete and depend upon branching
1Non-register machines, such as the Active Element Machine [7],
can execute multiple machine instructions simultaneously.
2A space X is uncountable if X contains an infinite number of
states and there does not exist a 1-to-1 correspondence between X
and the natural numbers N. A space X is countable if there exists a
1-to-1 correspondence between X and N.





instructions. While conditional branching instructions
are not required for universal computation, Rojas’s
methods [13] still use unconditional branching and
program self-modification. Moreover, about 75% to
80% of the control flow instructions, executed on
register machines, are conditional branch instructions.3
These observations suggest that a computer
program’s purpose can be subverted because the register
machine behavior is not always invariant when small
changes are made to one or more instructions.
Overall, we seek stable computation based on the
following design principle: if a small or moderate
change is made to a register machine program, then the
program’s purpose is stable; if a large change is made,
the program can no longer execute. Our principle is
partly based on the observation that it is generally far
more difficult to detect if a small change has altered
the purpose of a program. With a small change, the
tampered register machine program still can execute, but
does not perform the task that the original program was
designed to accomplish. For this reason, our goal is to
create stable computation that is also incomprehensible
to malware authors so that it is far more challenging
for malware to subvert the program without completely
destroying its functionality.
3. An Unstable C Program
We demonstrate unstable computation with C source
code [14] that adds 3 integers. This C code shows how
a 1-bit change to the address of only one instruction can
substantially alter the program’s behavior.
#include <stdio.h>
#define NUM_BITS 16
int pow2[NUM_BITS] = {0x8000, 0x4000, 0x2000, 0x1000,
0x800, 0x400, 0x200, 0x100,
0x80, 0x40, 0x20, 0x10,
0x8, 0x4, 0x2, 0x1};
int addition(int a, int b)
{
return (a + b);
}
int multiply(int a, int b)
{
return (a * b);
}
int exec_op(int* num, int n, int (*op) (int, int))
{
int i, v = num[0];
for(i = 1; i < n; i++)
{




3See figure A.14 in [5].




for(k = 0; k < n; k++)
{
printf("%d ", v[k] );
}
}
void print_binary(unsigned int v)
{
int k;
for(k = 0; k < NUM_BITS; k++)
{






int bop(int* m, int n, char* f, int (*op) (int, int))
{
int v = exec_op(m, n, op);
printf("\nresult = %d. address of ", v);




int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
int num[3] = {2, 3, 5};
print_numbers(num, 3);
printf("\n");
bop(num, 3, "addition", addition);
bop(num, 3, "multiply", multiply);
return 0;
}
aemea@Michaels-MacBook-Air C_program % ./ADD
2 3 5
result = 10. address of addition =
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
result = 30. address of multiply =
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Figure 1. Sum Changed to a Product
Figure 1 shows an execution of the compiled C
program: ADD. A sum 2 + 3 + 5 is converted to a
product 2 ∗ 3 ∗ 5, by flipping only one bit of the address
of instruction addition. This C program exhibits
unstable computation because a small change (flipping
one bit) in the C program causes a substantial change to
the outcome: namely, a sum equal to 10 is changed to a
product equal to 30.
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4. Cryptographic Model Assumptions
In our model, Alice’s goal is to hinder Eve
(malware author) from sabotaging Alice’s computation.
Additional assumptions about what information Eve
has access to are more appropriate to discuss after
a comprehensive description of our structurally stable
machine is provided. Some of these assumptions defer
prospective hardware implementations to a subsequent
paper. Bob is not part of our model. We do not address
commmunication between Alice and Bob, as is typical
with a public key exchange.
5. Structural Stability
Structural stability is a mathematical tool that can
be applied to computer programs because a register
machine program can be modeled as a discrete,
autonomous dynamical system [15]. When a perturbed
instruction is close enough to an original instruction
that is stable, then the computational behavior of the
program will not change. For this reason, structural
stability can be used to design a solution that hinders
malware sabotage. We briefly review topological
spaces, metric spaces and structural stability.
5.1. Topological Spaces & Metric Spaces
A topology [11] on a set X is a collection T of
subsets of X having the following properties: (a) ∅ and
X are both in T ; (b) The union of the elements of any
subcollection of T is in T ; (c) The intersection of the
elements of any finite subcollection of T is in T . A set
X for which a topology T has been specified is called
a topological space. A subset U of X is called open
in this topology if U belongs to the collection T . The
standard topology on R (real numbers) is generated from
arbitrary unions of open intervals and finite intersections
of open intervals, where an open interval is (a, b) =
{x ∈ R : a < x < b}.
For topological spaces X (domain) and Y (range), a
function f : X → Y is continuous if for any open subset
U of Y , the inverse image f−1(U) = {x ∈ X : f(x)
lies in U} is open in X’s topology. A function h : X →
Y is a homeomorphism if h is continuous, h is bijective
and h’s inverse h−1 : Y → X is continuous.
A metric space is a set X and a function (metric)
d : X ×X → R such that all three conditions hold: (1)
d(a, b) ≥ 0 for all a, b ∈ X where d(a, b) = 0 if and
only if a = b. (2) d(a, b) = d(b, a) for all a, b ∈ X .
(3) d(a, b) ≤ d(a, c) + d(c, b) for all a, b, c ∈ X .
5.2. Topological Conjugacy & C0 Stability
A discrete, dynamical system is a function f : X →
X , where X is a topological space. Two dynamical
systems f : X → X and g : Y → Y are topologically
conjugate if f and g are continuous and there exists a
homeomorphism h : X → Y such that h ◦ f = g ◦ h.
Let (X, d) be a metric space. The C0 distance
between functions f : X → X and g : X → X is given




: x ∈ X}, where sup
is the least upper bound. A function f : X → X is said
to be C0 structurally stable on X if there exists ε > 0
such that whenever ρ0(f, g) < ε for g : X → X , then
f is topologically conjugate to g. In other words, f is
structurally stable if for all dynamical systems g that are
close to f , then f is topologically conjugate to g.
After a register machine has halted, its halted
machine configuration represents what the machine has
computed. Topological conjugacy is useful because
each halted machine configuration corresponds to a
fixed point (halting point) of a dynamical system that
faithfully models the register machine. If h is a
topological conjugacy with h ◦ f = g ◦ h, then p is
a fixed point of f if and only if h(p) is a fixed point.
Hence, a topological conjugacy between machines M1
and M2 induces a 1-to-1 correspondence between the
halting configurations of M1 and M2.
6. A Structurally Stable Machine
We have two design goals, motivated by section 2:
A. Build instructions that are invariant to small
changes in their representation.
B. Hinder the adversary from figuring out how to
manipulate these machine instructions.
We start with a Turing complete, virtual machine, as
a starting point for building computation that satisfies
our two design goals. We describe procedures4 that
transform these virtual machine instructions: these
transformation procedures represent and execute the
functionality of the virtual machine instructions so
that the computation is stable under small changes
to the transformed instructions. Furthermore, these
transformed instructions also satisfy design goal B.
6.1. A Virtual Register Machine
Below is a brief description of the instructions for
our virtual machine. Our transformation procedures,
4Comprehensive hardware implementation(s) of these procedures
are beyond the scope of this paper.
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applied to these virtual machine instructions, are
described in subsections 6.2, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
SET A 14 stores 14 in register A.
ADD B C adds the contents of registers B and C and
stores the sum in register B.
SUB C 13 subtracts 13 from the contents of register
C and stores the difference in register C.
MUL D C multiplies the contents of register D and
register C and stores the product in register D.
DIV A 7 divides the contents of register A by 7 and
stores the quotient in register A. If A contains 26, then
after DIV A 7 is executed register A contains 3.
MOD A 7 divides the contents of register A by 7 and
stores the remainder in A. If register A contains 26, then
after MOD A 7 is executed register A contains 5.
JMP L_AB updates the program counter to execute
the instruction tagged by label L_AB. If L_AB contains
37, then instruction 37 will be executed next. JMP acts
as an unconditional branch instruction.
IF A B executes the next instruction if the contents
of register A equals the contents of register B. Otherwise,
the next instruction is skipped.
IFN C 5 executes the next instruction if the contents
of register C are not equal to 5. If register C contains 5,
the next instruction is skipped.
IFGT C 12 executes the next instruction if the
contents of register C are greater than 12. If register C
contains a number less than 13, the next instruction is
skipped.
The opcode for instruction name SET represents
SET in terms of bits. The other instruction names
{ADD,SUB,MUL,DIV,MOD,JMP,IF,IFN,IFGT,
STORE, GET} each have their own unique opcode
in terms of bits. An opcode is mathematically defined
as a function O : {SET,ADD,SUB,MUL,DIV,MOD,
JMP,IF,IFN,IFGT,STORE,GET}→ {0, 1}n such
that O is 1-to-1. 1-to-1 means O maps two different
instruction names to two distinct n-bit strings.
A valid instruction starts with an instruction name,
followed by one or two operands. In instruction
IFGT C 12, register C is the first operand and the
number 12 is the second operand. The JMP instruction
is the only instruction with one operand.
In subsection 6.6, example 1 implements a greatest
common divisor algorithm with this virtual machine.
In subsection 6.2, we develop computational tools
that transform these instructions so that the program
instructions are hidden, stable and unpredictable.
6.2. Randomizing Instruction Opcodes
We describe a procedure that randomizes opcodes
such that each opcode is a minimal Hamming distance
apart. Our random opcode procedure is a computational
tool for helping us achieve our two design goals.
First, we review some definitions from information
theory. {0, 1}n is the collection of all n-bit strings,
where each binary string a in {0, 1}n can represent an
opcode of a virtual machine instruction. Sometimes b
in {0, 1}p can represent an operand of a virtual machine
instruction, and in some cases n 6= p.
Let a = a1, . . . an and b = b1, . . . bn be binary
strings of length n. For each n, the Hamming metric
[16] is defined as d(a, b) =
n∑
i=1
|ai − bi|. It is easy to
verify that ({0, 1}n, d) is a metric space per section 5.1.
Note d(0010, 0111) = 2. Consider string c =
c1 . . . cn in {0, 1}n. A Hamming ball H(c,m) = {a ∈
{0, 1}n : d(c, a) ≤ m} has center c and radius m.
Let q be a quantum random bit generator5 [17].
Based on a quantum measurement, q returns a random
0 or 1. In procedures 1, 2, and 3, q helps construct
m distinct random opcodes each of length n that are
pairwise a minimum Hamming distance of 2l + 1 bits
apart. These procedures build random opcodes that are
stable, when there are at most l bits of sabotage on a
single opcode. A random opcode Ij is the center of a
Hamming ball with radius l. Geometrically, all opcodes
in H(Ij , l) can be repaired to the correct opcode Ij .
Procedure 1 builds an n-bit random opcode
Ij,1Ij,2 . . . Ij,n used by instruction Ij , after quantum
random bit generator q measures n random bits.
Procedure 1. Random Opcode
Input: n
set k := 1
while k ≤ n
{
set Ij,k to a random bit measured by q
increment k by 1
}
Output: Ij,1 Ij,2 . . . Ij,n
The jth random opcode, called Ij , is n bits long.
Procedure 2 begins with m random opcodes I1, I2, . . . ,
Im as input. Procedure 2 finds two distinct opcodes in
5We prefer a QRNG over a CSRNG based on the following
principle: no sentient being can capture or steal information that does
not yet exist. According to quantum theory, a quantum random bit
does not exist until a measurement occurs. A CSRNG’s effectiveness
depends upon on an algorithm: any Turing machine, implementing
the algorithm, violates our principle, and relies on a seed. A CSRNG
provides no unpredictability if the seed is known. A CSRNG also begs
the question: how is an unpredictable seed generated?
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{I1, I2, . . . , Im} that are a smallest Hamming distance
hµ apart.
Procedure 2. Minimal Hamming Pair
Input: m, n, and opcodes {I1, I2, . . . , Im}
set hµ := n+ 1
set i := 1
while i < m
{
set j := i+ 1
while j ≤ m
{
set h := d(Ii, Ij) in {0, 1}n
if (h < hµ)
{
set hµ := h
set iµ := i
set jµ := j
}
increment j by 1
}
increment i by 1
}
Output: Iiµ , Ijµ , hµ
Procedure 3 uses procedures 1 and 2 to build m
random opcodes (n-bit codes) that are pairwise at least
a Hamming distance of 2l + 1 apart.
Procedure 3. Minimal Hamming Distance
Input: l, m, n
call procedure 1 m times with input n :
output I1, . . . , Im
call procedure 2 with input I1, . . . , Im :
output Iiµ , Ijµ , hµ
set r := 0
while hµ < (2l + 1)
{
set b := 2l + 1− hµ
do b times
{
use q to randomly choose positive
integer k in the set {1, 2, . . . , n}
flip bit k in Iiµ
}
execute procedure 2 with input I1, . . . , Im
increment r by 1
}
Output: I1 . . . Im with d(Ij , Ik) ≥ 2l+1 when j 6= k
Flip bit k means: if the kth bit is 0, then set the
kth bit to 1; and if the kth bit is 1, then set the kth
bit to 0. Variable r counts the number of repairs on
a random opcode until any two distinct opcodes are at
least a distance of 2l + 1-bits apart. 2l + 1 should be
about 1 to 2.5 standard deviations less than n2 so that
outer loop while hµ < (2l + 1) promptly exits.6
If l is too large (e.g., (2l + 1) > n), then the outer
loop never exits and r → ∞. To avoid long computing
times, a variation of procedure 3 inserts, before the outer
loop, set l = b 14 (n− c
√
n)− 12c, where 1 ≤ c ≤
5
2 .
In our cryptographic model, Alice’s m random
opcodes I1, I2, . . . Im “act as her private keys.” Hence,
her random opcodes should be generated and stored in
Protected Machine Hardware (blue region in Figure 2)
so that procedure 3 can help assure anonymity and valid
execution of her instructions. It is also good practice for
Alice to keep l private.
Random Access Memory
Long Term Memory
    Unprotected Memory 
 Protected Machine Hardware
Procedure 3
 Quantum Random Bit Generator
Procedure 1 Procedure 4
Procedure 2 Procedure 5Procedure 6Procedure 7
Figure 2. Eve cannot access the blue region.
6.3. Instruction & Program Stability
We formally define instruction and program stability.
Definition 1. A set of opcodes (or operands)
{I1, . . . , Im} is s-bit stable if min{d(Ij , Ik) : j 6= k} ≥
s. In other words, if Ij and Ik are the closest opcodes
(operands) in {I1, . . . , Im}, then d(Ij , Ik) ≥ s.
Definition 2. An n-bit instruction I is s-bit stable if its
opcode and operands are both s-bit stable.
Remark 1. The random opcodes generated by a
successful exit of procedure 3 are 2l + 1-bit stable.
Procedure 2 returns hµ. hµ is the minimum distance
between any two distinct opcodes in {I1, . . . , Im}. A
successful exit of procedure 3 means the loop while
hµ < (2l + 1) exited; hence, hµ ≥ 2l + 1.
6 n
2
is the expected Hamming distance between two random n-bit
codes, where each bit occurs with probability 1
2
. The standard






Using definitions 1, 2 and remark 1, we can explain
the stability of programs, transformed by procedures
1-3, in terms of the theory of section 5. First, we need
to define a metric on a space of programs, where each
program is a finite sequence of transformed (procedures
1-3) instructions (before hiding). Consider a program
of transformed instructions P1 = (I1, I2, . . . , Im) and
another program of transformed instructions P2 =
(J1, J2, . . . , Jm). If two programs have the same length
m, define the distance between them as D(P1,P2) =
max{d(Ik, Jk) : 1 ≤ k ≤ m}. If programs P and Q
have different lengths, then define D(P,Q) = n, where
all program instructions in P and Q lie in {0, 1}n.
Assume each instruction Ik, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, in
P1 = (I1, I2, . . . , Im) is 2l + 1-bit stable. Consider P1
as a dynamical system. ProgramP1 is structurally stable
because whenever D(P1,P2) ≤ l each instruction Jk in
P2 that corresponds to Ik is resolved to the same opcode
and same operand(s). Thus, the dynamical (computing)
behavior of P1 is the same as program P2.
6.4. Hiding Operands and Opcodes in Noise
In 6.2, we provided procedures 1, 2, and 3 for
building opcodes stable to small changes. When
these procedures are also applied to operands, the
representation of the operands can become stable to
small changes. In our model, Eve is a sentient adversary,
so structural stability from classical mathematics alone
does not provide enough mathematical firepower to
build malware resistant computation. Hence, the
purpose of design goal B is to build a representation of
each instruction that is computationally intractable for
Eve to understand its meaning.
Procedure 4 builds a permutation based on [18, 19].
Procedure 4. Random Permutation ρ
Input: n
set ρ(1) := 1 set ρ(2) := 2 . . . set ρ(n) := n
set k := n
while k ≥ 2
{
use q to randomly choose positive
integer r in the set {1, . . . , k}
set t := ρ(r)
set ρ(r) := ρ(k)
set ρ(k) := t
decrement k by 1
}
Output: Permutation ρ on {1, . . . , n}
Procedure 5 uses procedure 4 to build a random
substitution box.
Procedure 5. Random Substitution Box σ
Input: η
call procedure 4 with input n = 2η to
create random permutation σ
Output: Substitution Box σ
σ maps an η-bit input to an η-bit output
The rest of this subsection describes how to hide
the meaning of the opcodes and operands from Eve.
Procedures 4 and 5 have different purposes even though
they both produce a random permutation. Procedure 5
constructs a σ that has size 2η . Typically, η = 8 because
8 bits is a byte, and n = 16 is too large.7 If the operands
in the base virtual machine have size equal to 64 bits
before hiding in 64 bits of noise, then procedure 5 is
called sixteen times to generate σ1 σ2 . . . σ16 for the
first operand. For the second operand, procedure 5 is
called sixteen more times to generate σ17 . . . σ32. In
general, σi and σj are statistically independent when
i 6= j, as result of using procedure 5, based on [19].
Procedure 4 builds ρ to locate the 64 bits of the
signal b1b2 . . . b64 inside the random noise. ρ lies in
the symmetric group on {1, 2, . . . , n}, and determines
where each bit of the signal (i.e., opcode or operand) is
located: the ith bit bi is stored at bit location ρ(i), where
1 ≤ i ≤ 64. When there are 64 bits of signal from
the operand or opcode and 64 bits of quantum random
noise, then the size of ρ is 128, i.e., n = 128.
Random noise is measured and stored in
the remaining 64 bit locations. The result is
128 bits of noise and signal, named s1 . . . s128.
Subsequently, the 16 randomly generated sboxes
σi with 1 ≤ i ≤ 16 are applied to s1s2 . . . s128
as follows: σ1(s1s2s3s4s5s6s7s8), σ2(s9 . . . s16),
. . . σ16(s121s122s123s124s125s126s127s128), which
is named c1c2 . . . c128. Next, a distinct random
permutation τ is generated on {1, 2, . . . , 128}.
τ is applied to c1c2 . . . c128, resulting in cτ(1)
cτ(2) . . . cτ(128). Then sixteen distinct sboxes α1
. . . α16 are randomly generated and applied to
cτ(1)cτ(2) . . . cτ(128) as follows: α1(cτ(1)cτ(2) . . . cτ(8))
. . . α16(cτ(121) . . . cτ(128)), resulting in o1 . . . o128.
In subsection 7.2, a birthday paradox statistical
test is described in order to address potential attacks
that involve stable instructions of size 128 bits. The
birthday attack test performs 2l compilations of the
same unmasked instruction. In 7.2, we also describe
a statistical test to address multiple transformations via
procedure 6 of the same instruction at different locations
in a single SVM compilation of the program.
7If η = 16, then σ has size 216 = 65536. If η = 16, then σ is
considerably more expensive than η = 8. Our goal is to store σ in
protected machine hardware (Figure 2) that is not accessible to Eve.
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For each time the SVM compilation tool is executed,
all ρ, σi, τ , αi and randomized opcodes are statistically
independent from each other and from all previous
compilations. Also, within one SVM compilation, the
random noise (n− k bits per opcode) generated for two
identical opcodes at different locations in the program is
statistically independent.
From our prior description, procedure 6 formally
specifies hiding a k-bit opcode (or operand) b1 . . . bk
in n − k bits of random noise. ρ and τ are distinct
random permutations on {1, 2, . . . , n}. ρ determines the
bit locations of b1 . . . bk hidden inside of noise. σ1 . . . σp
and α1 . . . αp are random sboxes.
Procedure 6. Hide in Noise
Input: k, n and k-bit string b1 b2 . . . bk
call procedure 4 with input n to build
random permutation ρ on {1, 2, . . . , n}
call procedure 1 with input n and store
noise in every bit location l1 l2 . . . ln
set j := 1
while j ≤ k
{
set bit location lρ(j) := bj
increment j by 1
}
call procedure 5 p times on input η and
generate substitution boxes σ1 . . . σp
apply substitution boxes σ1 . . . σp to input
l1 l2 . . . ln and compute c1 c2 . . . cn
call procedure 4 with input n to build
random permutation τ on {1, 2, . . . , n}
permute c1 . . . cn to cτ(1) . . . cτ(n)
call procedure 5 p times on input η and
generate substitution boxes α1 . . . αp
apply α1 . . . αp to input cτ(1) . . . cτ(n)
Output: o1 o2 . . . on
6.5. Hiding Instruction Order
Procedure 7 hides the hidden stable instructions,
constructed by procedure 6, inside a block of size b
containing dummy instructions. b is the sum of the
number of stable instructions and the number of dummy
instructions in the block. m is the maximum number of
stable instructions hidden. γ is a random permutation on
{1, 2, . . . , b}. S1, S2, . . . , Sm are a sequence of stable
instructions that are part of the program.
Procedure 7. Hide Stable Instructions in Block
Input: b, m, γ, and S1, S2, . . . and Sm
use q to randomly choose a positive
integer c in the set {1, 2, . . . , b b
2
c}
set i := 1 set j := 1 set k := 1
while i ≤ b
{
use q to randomly choose a positive
integer r in the set {1, 2, . . . , b}
if ( (r ≤ c) and (j < m) )
{
hide instruction Sj at location γ(i)




randomly build dummy instruction Dk
hide instruction Dk at location γ(i)
increment k by 1
}
increment i by 1
}
Table 1 shows a representation of the stable
hidden instructions permuted in the block with dummy
instructions after procedure 7 is completed.
Table 1. Hiding Instruction Order
Block Instr. Instr. Test Gamma
Index Name Type r ≤ c Index
1 Sj1 Valid True γ(j1)
2 Dr1 Dummy False γ(r1)
. . .
γ−1(1) S1 Valid True γ(1)
. . .
b Drk−1 Dummy False γ(rk−1)
In table 1, ji = γ−1(i) and ri = γ−1(i).
Because c is randomly selected in {1, . . . b b2c}, and
m is determined during compilation and m can be
randomly selected for each block, Eve does not know
how many valid instructions are in a block. Eve does
not know the probability distribution of valid versus
dummy instructions in a block; and Eve does not know
the block size. Eve does not know γ, and she does
not know how to distinguish a dummy opcode from a
valid opcode, since the dummy opcodes are also selected
using procedure 1.
In our cryptographic model, Alice’s Protected
Machine Hardware (Figure 2) should execute the
operations in procedures 6 and 7 because the sboxes
σ1 . . . σp and α1 . . . αp and permutations ρ, τ , γ “act
as Alice’s private keys.”
Page 7572
6.6. Executing Stable, Hidden Instructions
After the inverse of procedure 7 is performed on
a block of the program, executing a stable, hidden
instruction consists of 3 steps.
1. Unmask and find the nearest valid opcode.
2. Extract the operands from the noise.
3. Execute a valid instruction.
In our cryptographic model, we assume there is
at least one hardware implementation where all three
steps are executed in Protected Machine Hardware (blue
region in Figure 2). Our model assumes Eve does not
have access to the internal physical operations in the
blue region during the execution of these three steps.
With our model assumption, we proceed to examine
steps 1, 2, and 3 in more detail. We developed a software
tool, called SVM, in ANSI C [14] that performs these
3 steps. Our SVM tool uses the quantum random
bit generator in [20]. In general, our SVM tool can
execute any hidden program that operates according to
the virtual register machine instructions, described in
section 6.1. After a brief summary of steps 1, 2, and 3,
we demonstrate an example of our SVM tool, building
hidden, stable virtual register machine instructions.
We assume that our cryptographically stable
instructions are stored in Unprotected Memory (Figure
2). After a block of hidden instructions are retrieved
from Unprotected Memory, they are ordered, unmasked
and executed in the Protected Machine Hardware. In
step 1, the first argument of the instruction is a noisy
opcode. Our SVM tool finds the nearest valid opcode to
the noisy opcode, by computing the Hamming distance
between the noisy opcode and valid opcodes. If the
nearest opcode is a dummy opcode, the instruction is
ignored; otherwise, in step 2, the operands are extracted
from the noise by executing a procedure that performs
the inverse of procedure 6. In step 3, a valid opcode
executes with unmasked operands as input.
Example 1. Unmasked GCD Program
Symbols, following a semicolon on the same line, are
comments.
SET A 6 ; Instruction 0
SET B 10 ; Instruction 1
IF A 0 ; 2. If (A == 0) execute instruction 3.
JMP 12 ; 3. Branch to instruction 12.
IF B 0 ; 4. If (B == 0) execute instruction 5.
JMP 13 ; 5. Branch to instruction 13.
IFGT A B ; 6. If (A > B) execute instruction 7.
SUB A B ; 7. Store A-B in register A.
IFGT B A ; 8. If (B > A) execute instruction 9.
SUB B A ; 9. Store B-A in register B.
IFN A B ; 10. If (A != B) execute instruction 11.
JMP 2 ; 11. Branch to instruction 2.
SET A B ; Instruction 12




















After the last instruction SET B A executes, both
registers A and B are storing 2. Instruction numbers in
an SVM program always start at 0, so JMP 2 causes
the SVM to execute IF A 0. In the next section, we
analyze what our stable instructions look like to Eve in
Unprotected Memory after multiple SVM compilations.
7. Complexity, Statistics, & Performance
We estimate the complexity of our hiding procedure,
and estimate memory use and computing time.
7.1. Complexity Estimate
We use the same parameter values as in 6.4. For
larger registers, the complexity scales favorably because
f(n) = n! grows much faster than e(n) = 2n.
Calculating f(n)e(n) with sizes 128 and 256 bits:
f(128)
e(128) ∈
[10177, 10178] and f(256)e(256) ∈ [10
430, 10431]. f(n) is
compared to binary exponential growth e(n) because
procedures 4, 5 and 6 use permutations; standard
cryptographic methods rely on the P 6= NP assumption
that complexity grows exponentially. In procedure 6,
each 64-bit opcode (k = 64) is hidden in 64 bits of noise
(n = 128). There are 128 ∗ 127 . . . 66 ∗ 65 > 10126
locations for hiding a 64-bit operand in 64 bits of noise.
7.2. Statistical Testing for Two Attacks
The first test searches for a birthday paradox attack
with distinct SVM compilations of a fixed 64-bit random
opcode in the unmasked instruction SET A 6.
We used n = 64 for procedure 1 to generate the
random opcode for SET, and inputs l = 12, m = 12,
and n = 64 for procedure 3. We used input n = 128 for
procedure 4; and input η = 8 for procedure 5; and inputs
k = 64 and n = 128 for procedure 6. We searched
for collisions, where 75% of the bits match: that is,
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where the Hamming distance was greater than 96 for
two opcode portions of the instruction SET A 6.
The statistics for 44850 Birthday paradox collision
search comparisons are shown below, where each tally
is the hamming distance between two 128-bit hidden
opcodes, generated from instruction SET A 6. Let hi
be the number of pairs of distinct stable instructions
whose 128 bits of opcode are a Hamming distance of
i bits apart. Below is the data for a typical run with 300
stable instructions generated from SET A 6:
TOTAL number of hi computed = 44850.
h40 = 1. h41 = 1. h42 = 0. h43 = 2. h44 = 4. h45 = 6. h46 = 14.
h47 = 33. h48 = 64. h49 = 87. h50 = 150. h51 = 237. h52 = 328.
h53 = 460. h54 = 667. h55 = 902. h56 = 1114. h57 = 1451.
h58 = 1809. h59 = 2142. h60 = 2516. h61 = 2795. h62 = 2927.
h63 = 3068. h64 = 3157. h65 = 3184. h66 = 2929. h67 = 2729.
h68 = 2492. h69 = 2100. h70 = 1809. h71 = 1522. h72 = 1115.
h73 = 929. h74 = 676. h75 = 480. h76 = 361. h77 = 219.
h78 = 145. h79 = 93. h80 = 57. h81 = 38. h82 = 18. h83 = 12.
h84 = 1. h85 = 6. When i > 85, hi = 0.
Empirical mean = 64.02. µ = 64. Expected standard deviation σ = 5.66.
30039 hi are within σ of µ. Expected hi within σ = 30615.
42973 hi are within 2σ of µ. Expected hi within 2σ = 42805.
44714 hi are within 3σ of µ. Expected hi within 3σ = 44733.
No Hamming distances were close to 96 (75% of 128).
In test 2, we searched for an attack by looking
at multiple compilations of the same instruction at
different locations in a single SVM compilation of the
program. To simplify this search and make an attack
easier to find, we built a program with 150 identical
instructions: SET A 6. After this single compilation,
we computed pairwise Hamming distances. Statistics
for a typical run of test 2 are shown below:
TOTAL number of hi computed = 11175.
h43 = 4. h44 = 2. h45 = 3. h46 = 4. h47 = 7. h48 = 15. h49 = 30.
h50 = 43. h51 = 43. h52 = 75. h53 = 122. h54 = 167. h55 = 237.
h56 = 309. h57 = 389. h58 = 467. h59 = 520. h60 = 648.
h61 = 667. h62 = 701. h63 = 753. h64 = 867. h65 = 782.
h66 = 697. h67 = 670. h68 = 655. h69 = 535. h70 = 437.
h71 = 345. h72 = 259. h73 = 223. h74 = 168. h75 = 117.
h76 = 82. h77 = 46. h78 = 37. h79 = 23. h80 = 10. h81 = 7.
h82 = 6. h83 = 1. h84 = 1. h85 = 1. When i > 85, hi = 0.
Empirical mean = 63.90. µ = 64. Expected standard deviation σ = 5.66
7495 hi are within σ of µ. Expected hi within σ = 7628.
10735 hi are within 2σ of µ. Expected hi within 2σ = 10665.
11139 hi are within 3σ of µ. Expected hi within 3σ = 11146.
No Hamming distances were close to 96; the
statistics follow a binomial distribution with p = 12 . In
general, we do not expect this attack to be effective for
Eve because Alice should not voluntarily compile her
plaintext code with static “keys” on plaintext code that
repeats the same instruction multiple times on purpose.
Furthermore, Eve’s potential collisions occur only on
“keys” that Eve artificially constructs with the SVM
tool. In a proper use setting, Alice uses a different
set of “keys” and randomized opcodes on each separate
compilation on a particular machine, and procedure 7
further reduces the efficacy of this type of attack.
7.3. Hardware Performance Estimates
In section 6.4, 64-bit operands (or opcodes) are
hidden in 64 bits of noise (k = 64, n = 128). If
we assume that we are not utilizing 56 out of the 64
bits that represent the opcode, then our memory use in
unprotected memory increases linearly at most by 4x.
We use Shi and Lee [21] as a reference to estimate
computing speeds of our bit permutations executed in
Protected Machine Hardware (procedures 4 and 6). Shi
and Lee rigorously analyze implementing arbitrary bit
permutation operations in hardware. Their complexity
estimates are expressed in terms of logical effort [22].
Logical effort can be used to estimate the number of
stages required to implement the critical path of a given
logic function with CMOS, and determine the maximum
possible speed of the circuit.
In [21], they found that the Butterfly network is the
fastest architecture for implementing bit permutations.
For a 6-stage Butterfly network they found a latency
of 12.0 FO4 [23]. Microprocessors typically have a
cycle of time of 20-30 FO4, so the Butterfly network
should be able to complete all bit permutation operations
in 1 or 2 instruction cycles. The generation of the
quantum random bits can be performed offline to
support procedures 1-7. (The inverses of procedures 6
and 7 do not require a quantum random bit generator.)
8. Related Work
In [24], they present a general approach to
addressing code-injection attacks in scripting and
interpreted languages (e.g., web-based SQL injection),
by randomizing the instructions. In [24], they do
not address malware attacks at the machine instruction
(physical hardware) level; there is no notion nor use of
stability to build instruction opcodes and operands that
are resistant to small changes.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [25] is a
clever method for protecting Alice’s computations on
data in the cloud. However, FHE does not use stability,
and does not protect the computer instructions that store
the private FHE key. FHE defers the malware problem
to the user’s local computer; FHE does not address
how to hinder malware on the local computer. Some
FHE keys are 1 Gigabyte and the plaintext-to-ciphertext
expansion is 10,000 to 1 for just 100 bits of security [26,
27]. FHE’s huge memory requirements are not currently
economically feasible for protecting instructions in
hardware. From section 7, we see that procedures 1-7
surpass FHE by many orders of magnitude when one
compares the amount of complexity obtained for a given
amount of memory and computing speed.
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Secure multi-party computation (MPC) [28, 29]
enables a group to jointly perform a computation
without disclosing any participant’s private inputs. MPC
does not address when Alice does not trust her own
machine, or the machine instructions being executed on
her machine. With further research, it is conceivable that
the stability and / or hiding methods described herein
could be integrated into hardware with an augmentation
of one or more of the MPC protocols.
In [30], a parallel machine uses quantum
randomness and self-modification to emulate the
execution of a Universal Turing machine so that the
firing patterns of the parallel machine’s active elements
are random to an outside observer. A procedure,
described in [30], requires a novel neuromorphic
hardware architecture to effectively implement a
quantum random blackbox.
9. Summary
Malware can subvert the purpose of a register
machine program, by changing only one address in one
instruction. We built an SVM software tool (coded in
ANSI C) that implements a Turing complete, stable
virtual machine. Our SVM tool hides the operands and
opcodes in unprotected memory with a complexity that
exceeds FHE, and the tool’s procedures are feasible to
implement in current processors. A red team should
test under what conditions our cryptographically stable
virtual machine is resistant to sabotage.
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